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1. INTRODUCTION  
1. 1 Prologue 
Writing about International Criminal Law (ICL) is quite different from law in 
general. Not even mentioning the political aspect of international law as such, ICL 
aspires to deal with the most monstrous aspects of humanity. There cannot be 
anything more despicable than to be convicted for crimes against humanity. To 
differentiate between homicide and genocide is a challenging task, both morally and 
legally: how does one make the incomprehensible comprehensible? Is it within 
law’s potential to adequately respond to these atrocities?  
 Within ICL, the discussion ranges from post-colonial criticism to the potential of 
the human mind and the nature of evil, which makes for more of a hybrid, 
interdisciplinary field of research. I would thereby like to start this thesis with a 
rather extensive conclusion made by the late Hannah Arendt after attending the 
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem 1961-1962.  
 
Some years ago, reporting on the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, I spoke 
about ‘the banality of evil’ and meant with this no theory or doctrine but 
something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a 
gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, 
pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal 
distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness. However monstrous the 
deeds were, the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic, and the only 
specific characteristic one could detect in his past as well as in his behavior 
during the trial and the preceding police examination was something entirely 
negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think.1 
 
This perspective is the most inspiring reason for why I have developed a certain 
interest for ICL in general, and for individual responsibility for collectively 
committed atrocity, in particular. It was also an essential element in my first 
reaction concerning the former child soldier, Dominic Ongwen from Lord’s 
                                                
1 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Shocken Books, 
2003), 159. 
2 This amount, 70 charges, is the largest number of counts in the history of international criminal 
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Resistance Army (LRA), who is currently awaiting 70 charges of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court (ICC), some that 
he himself have been a victim of.2 
1. 2 Lord’s Resistance Army and Child Soldiering 
For 30 years, the rebel group LRA, originating from Acholi (Northern Uganda), 
plundered in Uganda and across borders in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and the Central African Republic. The LRA have operated with 
extraordinary violence and brutality, they have launched attacks masquerading as 
military soldiers and murdered equate to the widespread nature of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Fighting for a ‘biblical’ state, the group has killed more 
than 100 000 people, and kidnapped more than 60 000 children over the three 
decade-long conflict.3 Capturing those useful for their group, the LRA targeted 
children strong enough to carry weapons to be indoctrinated into the organization 
and transformed into child soldiers. Partly because of this brutality, the ICC issued 
arrest warrants in 2005, concerning five of the leaders: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, 
Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen.4 While the rest are either 
dead or still at large, Ongwen, after surrendering himself to US troops in the Central 
African Republic, is now awaiting trial before the ICC under the charges of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, pillage and enslavement. 
The Ongwen case is an especially adequate subject to discuss the width of 
individual responsibility under ICL since he, as a legal subject, is both a victim and 
a perpetrator. As a ‘victim-perpetrator’, he has suffered from the crime against 
humanity of enslavement, war crimes such as conscription and use as a child 
soldier, and of cruel treatment – the same crimes that he now stands accused of.5 
                                                
2 This amount, 70 charges, is the largest number of counts in the history of international criminal 
tribunals, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, International Criminal 
Court. 
3 Jason Burke, ‘Child soldier to war criminal: the trial of Dominic Ongwen’, The Guardian, 27 
March 2016,  
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/mar/27/dominic-ongwen-war-crimes-trial-former-child-
soldier-icc-uganda. 
4 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen, Case No. ICC- 02/04-01/05-57, Warrant of Arrest from the International Criminal Court, 
13 October 2005. 
5 All parties in the procedure acknowledge Ongwen’s background as a child solider, see for instance 
the statement of the Prosecutor in Transcript of Confirmation of Charges hearing 22 January 2016 
page, 58-59. 
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Despite the well-documented list of atrocities, I could not help but question the 
issue of actual guilt. 
 It is evident that the case of Ongwen causes a lot of headache among the 
professionals around the ICC, one of them being the defence counsel of Ongwen 
who stated:  
 
When you get a person at the age of ten, and you keep him in the bush, you 
keep him, and teach him the art of killing, the art of remorselessness – you 
know – he turns into an animal. So is he responsible for the change of heart – 
is he responsible? So, I find a lot of conflict in my mind, about what I would 
do with a man like Dominic Ongwen.6  
 
Even the President of the assembly of the state parties of the ICC seems confused, 
answering the question of why a victim of abduction should be indicted by replying 
‘I am asked this question … and I have to say I do not know’.7 The question of 
prosecuting subjects that have experienced child soldiering has also been addressed 
by the Secretary General of the UN upon the establishment of the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone. In the Sierra Leone Report, he recognises the moral dilemma:  
 
The possible prosecution of children for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes presents a difficult moral dilemma. More than in any other conflict 
where children have been used as combatants, in Sierra Leone, child 
combatants were initially abducted, forcibly recruited, sexually abused, 
reduced to slavery of all kinds and trained, often under the influence of drugs, 
to kill, maim and bum. Though feared by many for their brutality, most if not 
all of these children have been subjected to a process of psychological and 
physical abuse and duress which has transformed them from victims into 
perpetrators.8 
 
                                                
6 Said by the former LRA Legal Advisor and present defense counsel for Ongwen, Krispus Ayena 
Odong, 28 October 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXoT2I27oMU.  
7 Profile of the LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen, NTVUganda, 7 January 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMZ-Kytz7E0  
8 The Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
U.N. SCaR, 1: 23, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000). 
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Child soldiers are raised in depraved surroundings with structural violence always 
present. Raised under duress, the children are being ordered to kill others trying to 
escape the armed group and often stand before the choice to kill or be killed. As 
Hannah Arendt puts it, the ‘comprehension does not deny the outrageous … it 
means the facing up to, and resisting of, reality, whatever that may be’.9 
 Before moving further, I would like to stress that this thesis does not advocate 
impunity, or in any other way to marginalize the atrocities that ICL was created to 
give response to. To question the ambivalent relationship between individual 
responsibility in an ‘widespread and systematic attack’ of Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute on the one hand, and the possible context-based guilt of the society where 
the perpetrator is raised on the other, risks to be misunderstood as relativizing in 
absurdum. With that said, ICL should not be self-evident in its purpose; intolerable 
atrocities do not provide ICL with any lower thresholds of legitimacy than criminal 
law in general. It is not enough that it just ‘feels right’ to punish. On the contrary, 
the importance of criticism for the sake of improvement is even more desired in the 
light of intolerable atrocities – and with that desire in mind I write this thesis. 
1. 3 Aim  
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the new legal subject victim-perpetrator, and to 
investigate the legal and moral dilemma of prosecuting former child soldiers. This 
unprecedented situation challenges earlier jurisprudence from the ICC where the 
suffering from being a child soldier has been assessed as on going, a trauma that 
never goes away. The question of how to develop case law on this matter is 
particularly interesting. This thesis does not only discuss the effects of declaring 
Ongwen guilty or innocent, but also discusses the narrative in which that is done. 
What issues that are included in this narrative are of wider importance than to 
Ongwen himself, since this will set a future precedent that will affect international 
criminal trials long after the Ongwen trial is done. Trials in ICL are, as has been 
argued before, not only about judging but also about establishing historical record.10 
The intention is to question the narrative of the trials, and discuss how we could 
                                                
9 Hanna Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York City The 
Viking Press 1963), viii. 
10 Cf. William A. Shabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach’, Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 7 (1997) and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between 
Impunity and Show Trials’, (2002), 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol 6. 
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provide etiological understanding of how atrocity occurs and spread. Subsequently, 
this thesis will assess whether this consideration of the narrative is within the 
capacity of ICL. This will be done through the following main issues: (1) Why 
former child soldiers are a legal issue; (2) Why victim-perpetrators shall be 
punished in ICL; (3) The narrative in ICL-trials and (4) The capacity of ICL. 
1. 4 Scope and Limitations 
The scope of the thesis is of course tied to answering the main questions above. The 
discussion regarding the second question of why we should punish a victim-
perpetrator will not engage in any deepened analysis of mens rea, the mental 
element of the crime; rather, I will probe the grounds for excluding responsibility.
 The concept of victim-perpetrators transcends the traditional line between victim 
and perpetrator in criminal law – both national and international. Not really suitable 
as either ugly perpetrator or pure victim, it creates a lacuna, which lacks coverage in 
the literature.11 However, this thesis will not examine child soldiers as subjects in 
ICL, instead it will concentrate on the issues relating to former child soldiers. That 
said, the thesis contains aspects of child soldiers as protected by international law in 
general. 
 The procedure of Ongwen is still in pending, which means that documents 
submitted to the ICC after 20 December 2016 and the judgment itself are not to be 
covered below. This fact is, of course, a limitation in itself, but also a certain 
academic privilege in producing text on the brink of the creation of precedent. 
1. 5 Method and Material 
First of all, the structure and nature of this thesis is most similar to that of an article 
in an academic journal. For example, I have used the style guide from International 
Journal of Transitional Justice.  
 No international tribunal has yet considered the legal issues relating to the 
responsibility of former child soldiers. Furthermore, this issue has only sparingly 
been addressed in the doctrine. Below, ICL and its case law will be analysed with a 
contextual method of interpretation where I focus on judgments as narrative, as an 
establisher of the past in a post-conflict atmosphere. Additionally, writing this thesis 
                                                
11 The only scholarship so far: Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Victims Who Victimize: Transcending 
International Criminal Law’s Binaries’, London Review of International Law Vol 4, Issue 2 (2016). 
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on the unprecedented calls for analogies with domestic law, comparative methods of 
interpretations of earlier case law and interdisciplinary reason in search for the 
legitimate precedent. One example of the interdisciplinary method is the extensive 
use of the mainly political philosopher Hannah Arendt, although by some 
recognized as a theorist of ICL.12 As mentioned, there is no precedent regarding 
former child soldiers and the use of jurisprudence from international tribunals is 
therefore limited, not to mention that the Ongwen case is pending before the ICC. 
The majority of the material used is thus from the academia.  
 The approach will be to compare theories and criticism about ICL as establisher 
of history with the purpose of individual responsibility for international crimes, 
including discussing the discourse setting at trial and the relevance of context in 
international criminal trials. 
1. 6 Introducing the Dilemma of the Victim-Perpetrator 
The first victim-perpetrator to enter an ICC trial is the above-mentioned former 
child soldier Dominic Ongwen. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA when walking to 
school at the age of nine, and then ‘… tortured … forced to watch people being 
killed and was used for fighting as a child soldier’.13 Too small to hike, he was 
carried by older rebels towards the camp, instantly placed in the house of his 
lapmony (teacher) Vincent Otti – formerly second-in-command next to Joseph 
Kony, the leader of the LRA.14 Why we have not seen any similar cases until now is 
not only because of the rather few trials at the ICC, but also because most child 
soldiers do not rise within the ranks to become one of the ‘most responsible’. The 
Prosecutor of the ICC has expressed the selectivity, urging to ‘focus its 
investigations … on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders 
of the State or organization allegedly responsible for those crimes’. 15  While, 
Ongwen still remains the youngest ever to be in custody in The Hague.  
                                                
12 David Luban, ‘Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International Criminal Law’, International Crim-
inal Law Review 11 (2011), 621-641. 
13 Thomas Odhof, part of the defense team for Ongwen, 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/mar/27/dominic-ongwen-war-crimes-trial-former-child-
soldier-icc-uganda  
14 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript from Pre-
Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court. 
15 Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor (2003), p. 7, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/ 
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If criminal responsibility in ICL strictly focuses on the age of eighteen, the division 
between victim and perpetrator can be upheld. However, the Prosecutor of the ICC 
has not accepted any policy of former child soldiers accused of core crimes.16 To 
uphold this age limit is, of course, comfortable, but if we look at the ICC as a 
storyteller that shall establish the truth of events of international crimes it is a not 
very suitable strategy to handle a past full of conflict. To see ICL as a service of 
remembrance is nothing new or unusual: ‘The lessons of history must be repeated 
for future generations in order to help prevent the political consequences of the 
crimes that were associated with undemocratic regimes…’17  
 If you are accused of committing war crimes you most likely possess a complex 
personality. However, this is the first time this duality has reached an international 
tribunal and the profile is not new. On the contrary, this kind of victim-background 
is a common foundation in the creation of a war criminal and plays a frequent role 
in how atrocities occur and spread. The only combination of facts necessary to 
create this legal and moral dilemma is a conflict long-enduring enough to let 
someone grow from child soldier to one of the ‘most responsible’ – and an 
international community passive enough to let the conflict be long-enduring in the 
first place. The Ongwen judgment will be an important precedent on how ICL will 
handle complex perpetrators such as former child soldiers in the future. To put it in 
the words of the late controversial Jacques Vergès: ‘The beauty of a trial can be 
measured by the trail it leaves behind, long after the sentence has been 
pronounced.’18 
  Perpetrators in ICL are generally viewed as sadists and savages, but most likely 
they are ordinary persons. Ordinary persons in extraordinary circumstances might 
create a social construction where killing and raping is something necessary and 
good – a virtue. Alette Smeulers has created three pre-atrocity categories of people: 
(1) the law-abiding citizen; (2) borderline types, and (3) criminals. When atrocity 
occurs, these characters develop into different types of perpetrators. In short, these 
typologies of perpetrators consist of: the criminal mastermind; the profiteer; the 
criminal/sadist; the fanatic; the conformist/follower and the compromised 
                                                
16 The Office of the Prosecutor did not mention it in the DRAFT Policy in Children, (22 June 2016). 
17 William A. Shabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach’, Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 7 (1997), 516. 
18 Jaques Vergès in Brita Sandberg and Eric Follath ‘Interview with the Notorious Lawyer Jaques 
Vergès: There is No Such Thing as Absolute Evil’ Der Spiegel, 21 November 2008. 
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perpetrator. The compromised perpetrator can also be seen as a captive participant 
acting through fear; the victim-perpetrator would be placed under this compromised 
type. The compromised type is in some way or another forced or pressured into 
collective violence in a poor social situation such as unemployment or young age.19 
  International criminal trials assess crimes committed in extraordinary chaos that 
contain complexities that domestic trials do not need to examine. In this case, the 
concatenation of victim and perpetrator disrupt the normal division in criminal 
trials. Immi Tallgren explains how the normal division is troublesome in ICL: 
 
The seemingly unambiguous notions of innocence and guilt create consoling 
patterns of causality in the chaos of intertwined problems of social, political, 
and economic deprivation surrounding the violence. Thereby international 
criminal law seems to make comprehensible the incomprehensible.20  
 
Further, Tallgren describes individual criminal responsibility as a reducing 
phenomenon making atrocities easier for the eye it reduces complexity and the scale 
of multiple responsibilities to a mere background. However, Janus-faced subjects, 
such as Ongwen, do not necessarily make the atrocities easier for the eye. Instead, 
empathy arouses when reading about the tragic and ironic fate of Ongwen. 
Discussing the subject with friends and colleagues made it clear to me that there is 
an interesting difference between the intuitive reactions from legal and non-legal 
minds. The non-legal minds tend to advocate acquittal on moral grounds, while the 
legal ones seem more likely to support conviction. 
  
                                                
19 Alette Smeulers, ‘Perpetrators of International Crimes: Towards a Typology’, in Supranational 
Criminology: Towards a Criminology of International Crimes, ed. Alette Smeulers and Roelof 
Haveman (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2008.), 234-257. 
20 Immi Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, European Journal of 
International Law vol 13 no .3 (2002), 593 f. 
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2. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND THE VICTIM-PERPETRATOR 
2. 1 A Legal Issue? 
The critical reader might ask the question if the topic of my thesis is relevant at all. 
Many perpetrators possess a tragic background where they in one way or another 
have been victims of deprivation. In fact, the Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) of the 
ICC dismisses the argument that Ongwen’s individual responsibility should be 
excluded because of his victim-background, by stating that it ‘is entirely without 
legal basis, and the Chamber will not entertain it further.’21 But the case is still 
pending and we do not have any precedent regarding criminal responsibility for 
former child soldiers. 
  Upholding the consequent age limit of eighteen for criminal responsibility under 
the Rome Statute provides legal certainty. The selective notion of the most 
responsible doctrine, however, does not. 22  This aspect of illegitimacy is not 
necessarily only negative. This is exactly the flexible political side of ICL, closer to 
customary international law, which domestic criminal law does not possess. 
Flexibility creates considerable room for manoeuvring the development of a 
doctrine where proper victim-perpetrators of the Ongwen sort could be excluded 
from the ‘most responsible-sphere’. Perhaps, Ongwen’s background cannot save 
him from a sentencing judgment and this type of defence will potentially never 
work for any future victim-perpetrator at trial before the ICC. Once again, this 
thesis is not pursuing impunity for victim-perpetrators. 
 However, the Ongwen case provides some inconsistency when read in the light 
of the Lubanga case. 23 In Lubanga, the court convicted Thomas Lubanga for 
enlisting or conscripting of child soldiers as a war crime. However, Lubanga had 
                                                
21 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Pre Trial Chamber II of 
the International Criminal Court, (23 March 2016), para 150.  
22 The Prosecutor of the ICC has expressed his discretion, urging to ‘focus its investigations […] on 
those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly 
responsible for those crimes’. See, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor 
(2003), p. 7, see  
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-
60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf 
23 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment of the Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal Court, para 1358.  
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not been a child soldier himself. One aspect for the crime to be considered severe 
was that the suffering from being a child soldier is linear and continues for life. The 
consequences of victimhood follow the child into adulthood. Child soldiers are thus 
granted protection by the ICL sphere. The continued aspect of the crime tied to 
child soldiering is best pictured by the following quote from former Chief 
Prosecutor Ocampo:  
 
They cannot forget the beatings they suffered; they cannot forget the terror 
they felt and the terror they inflicted; they cannot forget the sounds of their 
machine guns; they cannot forget that they killed; they cannot forget that they 
raped and that they were raped.24 
 
Relying on the expert submission of Dr Elisabeth Schauer, the ICC states that a 
significant number of the children who were interviewed had developed post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Following the judgment in the decision on 
sentencing Lubanga, the Court relied upon Dr Schauer when assessing the gravity 
of the crimes committed. The protection granted to child soldiers does not only 
entail injuries during fighting, but also the trauma of being recruited.25 Additionally, 
the Chamber is quoting her statement that ‘the post-traumatic stress tends to persist, 
possibly for the remainder of the individual’s life.’ Further, that ‘former child 
soldiers … have little skills to handle life without violence … show ongoing 
aggressiveness within their families and communities even after relocation to their 
home villages’ and that ‘psychological exposure and suffering from trauma can 
cripple individuals and families even into the next generations’.26  
 In the Ongwen case, however, the narrative shifts.27 The PTC II dismissed this 
defence completely by focusing solely on Ongwen as an adult, commenting his 
childhood as irrelevant. Expert submissions like this seem to belong to pure victims 
only. The Chamber held that ‘the circumstances of Ongwen’s stay in the LRA ... 
                                                
24 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-107, Transcript from 
Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, page 4-5.  
25 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence 
of the Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, para 38. 
26 Ibid, para 40-41. 
27 This point was first stressed by Mark A. Drumbl in ‘Shifting Narrative: Ongwen  and Lubanga on 
the Effects of Child Soldiering’, Justice in Conflict, https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/04/20/shifting-
narratives-ongwen-and-lubanga-on-the-effects-of-child-soldiering/ 
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cannot be said to be beyond his control...’ and that ‘escapes from the LRA were not 
rare.’28 It underscored that Ongwen ‘could have chosen not to rise in hierarchy and 
expose himself to increasingly higher responsibility to implement policies’. This is a 
peculiar assessment based on the general evidence that escapes did occur. It is not, 
however, possible to make this evaluation without knowing how it actually was for 
Ongwen. 29  The defence devotes a great deal of their pleading to describing 
numerous escape attempts, and the sanctions from Kony if the escape attempt 
failed.30 The past life was not of any particular importance for the Court, but instead 
temporary and ending. In fact they do not mention his background at all in the Pre-
Trial Brief submitted by the ICC Chief Prosecutor on 6 September 2015.31 It seems 
like the ICC cannot judge the Ongwen case in the light of the Lubanga case, perhaps 
because the Ongwen case disturbs the comfortable division between victims and 
perpetrators.32 This inconsistency makes the question of former child soldiers 
legally relevant.  
 If ICL fails in finding a way to appropriately address the victim-perpetrator 
subject, considerable amount of important understanding of conflict is lost: 
‘…recognizing these perpetrators as victims is quite critical, because if we do not 
see them as victims, we are unlikely to understand the true horror of [the context]’.33 
Acting in the sphere of politics, even more so than national criminal law, the ICC 
needs to explicitly touch on these structural contexts where child soldiering and 
other international crimes are fostered. It is, nonetheless, not clear that criminal law  
possesses the functions to adequately handle this. One alternative is,  
however controversial, to not persecute these victim-perpetrators and practice the 
selectivity of the ICC in a new suit of silence – juris silentum.34 It is not necessary 
that the law shall be involved; let us not forget that the majority of core crimes 
                                                
28 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Pre Trial Chamber II of 
the International Criminal Court, (23 March 2016), para 154. 
29 In comparison ‘No one can judge who had not been there’, Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and 
Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn  (New York: Shocken Books, 2003), 18. 
30 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Transcript from Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International 
Criminal Court, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG 
31 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Prosecution’s Trial Brief for the 
International Criminal Court, (6 September 2016). 
32 Christine E. J. Schwöbel, ‘The Comfort of International Criminal Law’, Law and Critique 24(2) 
(2012). 
33 Erica Bouris, Complex Political Victims. Sterling, VA: (Boulder: Kumarian Press 2007), 67. 
34 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Victims Who Victimize: Transcending International Criminal Law’s Binaries’, 
London Review of International Law Vol 4, Issue 2 (2016), 217–246. 
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committed never end up in the ICC.   
  Notwithstanding inconsistency or content of judgment, it is submitted that the 
former child soldier still would be relevant for discussion on a moral and political 
ground: the moral foundations and the public opinion of ICL are relevant for its 
evolution and survival. For instance, the survival of the ICC is dependent on state 
parties accepting not only the jurisprudence, but also its moral and political effect, 
with treat of withdrawal from the statute. The necessary connection between law 
and morality is especially present in ICL; for instance, international crimes that are 
allowed by corrupt states are still international crimes on the basis of a conception 
of ‘international morality’.35 To acknowledge the contextual background of these 
crimes, even in a sentencing judgment, is an important response to these atrocities. 
And in the end, that is everything that ICL is – a response to atrocities committed 
against mankind.  
  Since the narrative, so far, changed between Lubanga and Ongwen, there seems 
to be an uncertain picture of the former child soldier, and corollary the victim-
perpetrator. Portraying Ongwen as a former child soldier would disturb the 
courtroom game where, in the end, the verdict shall state innocent or guilty. 
Irrespectively of whether the victim-perpetrators will enjoy mitigated judgments in 
the future, the complexities of these individuals need to be considered. If the 
complexities are left out, the most negative aspects of the individual criminal 
responsibility present themselves in trials where the sentence per se is more 
important than a thoroughly legitimate procedure. Non-nuanced trials, that 
automatically vindicate the Prosecutor, are in risk to become ‘show trials’, were an 
individual is convicted to show the public that something is done about these 
atrocities.36   
  In the end, these crimes are considered the worst partly because of the 
complexity and the need of a mass machinery to carry them out. Indoctrination by 
propaganda and duress are clear aspects of mass atrocity, and thus also the trials.  
The question is if a fair trial, a plausible portrait of the victim-perpetrator, could be 
achieved within the ICC. Could the ICC have followed the Lubanga view on ‘child 
soldiers for life’ and simultaneously do what is expected – to convict Ongwen? This 
                                                
35 About the law and morality as forming legality, see Frank Haldemann. ‘Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans 
Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law’, Ratio Juris 18 (2005), 163. 
36 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, (2002), 6 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, vol 6, 11. 
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challenge is one of the most central issues in the proceedings. How the ICC should 
address and handle these dual characters of victim-perpetrators is therefore a 
question legally and morally relevant to discuss herein. 
2. 2 Why Punish a Victim-Perpetrator?   
First and foremost, the essence of individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes withholds a liberal perspective where actors, individuals, are punishable for 
structural violence. The strictly liberal perspective is that everyone should be 
punished for his or her conducts, and no one should be outside-of-law.37 The 
alternative is a more structural point of departure where individuals are not to 
blame, and an alternative reconciliation, such as amnesty, could be provided that is 
liberating but not liberal. As a matter of principle, everyone should be accountable 
for core crimes in a campaign against impunity.   
 Which individuals that could be factually liable vary. The general policy of the 
ICC and ICL is to observe those most responsible for the most serious crimes. 
Obedience to order is no excuse for responsibility in ICL: ‘The fact that a person 
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him 
from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact 
possible to him.’38 On this note, it is interesting to raise the question of whether the 
most responsible doctrine is based on reasons of procedural efficiency or on the 
concept of transferred mens rea – where those most responsible are seen as 
indoctrinators transferring their criminal intent to the masses. 
 The individual responsibility in ICL was first expressed in one of the IMT 
judgments in Nüremberg and the underlying logic is the same today:  
 
That international law imposes duties on and liabilities on individuals as well 
as upon states has long been recognized … crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
                                                
37 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, (2002), 6 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, vol 6, 2. 
38 ILC, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (1950). 
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individuals who commit such crimes can provisions of international law be 
enforced.39  
 
However, the victim-perpetrators do not fit as well as the guilty and diabolically evil 
‘men’ that you imagine when you read the IMT judgment. Perhaps, the complete 
perpetrators never existed; instead, we need to punish these complex personalities 
and recognize that the complexity is what makes them human: ‘We must not believe 
everything about a man, because a man can say everything. We must believe only 
what is human about him.’40 That is, to see Ongwen as just another variation of the 
tragic backgrounds often shared by perpetrators of atrocity – to see him as just 
another perpetrator, just another human, driven to the utter monstrosity of his own 
capacity. 
 The freedom of moral choice is also represented in the Article 31 (1d) of the 
Rome Statute with the duress defence. A criminal system where someone is 
punished for acting out of absolute necessity cannot be legitimate; the legitimate 
sentence demands some sort of freedom and intention. Where there is no freedom 
there cannot be any threat, because this threat of punishment would not make the 
person act any differently.  
  In light of the discussion of moral choice, it is time to discuss the existence of 
choice in the Ongwen case. The alternative to obeying orders, and acting within the 
criminal normality of the LRA, was to escape. Although sanctioned, people did 
succeed to flee the LRA. The motives to escape were not necessarily because of the 
ill treatment they were forced to inflict on civilians, but also the ill treatment that 
they themselves suffered. Nonetheless, escaping the LRA was a way to resist 
participating in mass atrocity. The majority, however, chose not to choose – a sort 
of thoughtlessness. To abandon thinking, willing and judging is, according to 
Arendt, why atrocity and evil deeds can spread like ‘fungus on the surface’.41  
                                                
39 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22, London, 
1950, at 447. 
40 Cyrano de Bergerac quoted in Pierre Vidal-Naquet, ‘A Paper Eichmann’, trans., Maria Jolas, 
Democracy 1, 2 (1981), 93. 
41 Hannah Arendt to Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings, ed. Jerome Kohn and 
Ron H. Feldman (New York, Schocken Books, 2007), 471. 
 16 
The question is whether we can hold people responsible for conforming to their new 
environment; if we can hold them responsible for not telling right from wrong in a 
morally inverted society. The majority reaction is to stop thinking and instead act as 
others act and believe what others believe.42 For a person with a childhood defined 
by victimisation of international crimes, the natural custom pattern is presumably to 
imitate the acceptable action. The chance that such a person can be the exception 
that resists and, after a silent conversation in his own mind, reaches a personal 
division of right and wrong, distinct from the rest of the LRA, must be regarded as 
very slight. However, Arendt holds that the only excusable way to handle an 
inverted morality is a full withdrawal – in this case to escape from the LRA – even 
if that would mean to suffer the consequences. The wrongdoer in this quote should 
be understood as herself, her fictional past.  
 
If I would do what is now demanded of me as the price of participation, ...  I 
could no longer live with myself ... Hence, I much rather suffer wrong now, 
and even pay the price of a death penalty in case I am forced to participate, 
than do wrong and then have to live together with a wrongdoer.43 
 
A fundamental question that should be regarded in this matter is why we should 
punish individuals for core crimes. When it comes to the purpose of the ICC itself, 
the negotiators behind the Statute held that the new Court primarily serves to 
prevent future atrocities. ‘… punishment of war criminals should be motivated 
primarily by its deterrent effect, by the impetus it gives to improve standards of 
international crimes’.44 This argument is not so convincing, even when defining 
deterrence broadly; that it is within the ability of a legal system such as the ICC to 
prevent further atrocities, even in the bush in northern Uganda.  First of all, one may 
wonder what kind of attention the LRA leaders directed towards the ICC prior to the 
issued arrest warrant – after the crimes were committed. Even less attention was 
                                                
42 Tamar De Waal, ‘Personal Responsibility Under Totalitarian Regimes: An Analysis of Hannah 
Arendt’s Philosophy On The Prevention of Evildoing and Criminal Liability For International 
Crimes’, Amsterdam Law Forum (2012), 135. 
43 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Shocken Books, 
2003), 156. 
44 Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Law, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1992), 14. 
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paid by Ongwen as an abused child soldier, one may speculate.  
  If you take the philosophical view that the perpetrators of these crimes are 
demonically evil, such calculations based on ICC jurisprudence are not plausible, 
since prosecution does not ‘scare the devil’. If you instead take the view that evil is 
more banal, that the perpetrators actually believe that they are acting to do good, 
this calculation is also out of the question – they are doing the right thing!45 
Additionally, international prosecutions are rare and most probably, the risk of 
ending up in the ICC is viewed as slight.46 Internal ‘prosecutions’ within the LRA, 
however, are not rare. The obedience to authority is compounded with death threats 
for even banal misfortunes. Put simply, sanctions for escaping the LRA machinery 
was far more deterrent than ICC arrest warrants.  
  It could be argued, in an Arendt manner, that the individual convictions are 
necessary but inadequate and destroy legal order. It may be added, as Koskenniemi 
interprets Arendt statement, that the tragedies are sometimes so metaphysically 
significant and the punishing of individuals does not come close to measuring up to 
it.47 These scholars doubt ICL’s ability to handle events of enormous historical and 
political impact with the responsibility for a few individuals in The Hague. Michel 
Foucault is adding something similar, stating that: ‘There is aspects of evil that have 
such power of contagion, such a force of scandal that any publicity multiples them 
infinitely. Only oblivion can suppress them’.48 Individual responsibility presumes 
certain levels of rationality among the perpetrators, which seems somehow limited 
as a model of explanation. This is certainly the case since these crimes are often 
committed in a ‘context of the chaos of massive violence, incendiary propaganda, 
and upended social order that contours atrocity’.49 
 Notwithstanding arguments about faint deterrence and the inadequacy of 
punishing individuals, there is another argument favouring punishment that could be 
tied to Arendt’s theory of inverted moral societies: a criminal trial should be viewed 
as a part of transitional justice where the judgment is seen as the final indication that 
                                                
45 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, (2002), 6 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, vol 6, 2. 
46 David Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, 23 Fordham 
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47 Ibid, at 2. 
48 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization (New York: Vintage Books 1965), 67. 
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a certain organization or state belonged to a morally inverted past. A trial could be a 
community-creating symbol of reaffirmation, to ‘perform … a successful “final 
judgment” in the religious sense, a performance that would ultimately enable the 
state itself to function as a moral agent.’50 This argument is connected to the 
narrative and establishing of historical record and will be discussed more 
thoroughly under headings 2.3–2.4. There is no doubt, however, that a conviction of 
Kony would be a stronger symbol in Uganda to reaffirm the moral community. 
While Ongwen, once again, symbolizes the victim of that very inverted moral 
reality rather than the agent of said inversion  
 The charges against Ongwen regard crimes committed when he was an adult, and 
his child soldier background could therefore not be a defence in itself. Crimes 
committed under the age of 18 will not be addressed in accordance with Article 26 
of the Rome Statute. Instead the charges concern attacks on civilians from 2004 to 
2005 and his background must be intertwined with a defence category in Article 31 
of the Rome Statute. In the pleading of the defence before the PTC II, however, the 
notion of transferred mens rea is submitted. The rhetorical question to the bench is 
whether he ‘owned his own mind’, or if he was ‘carrying the missions, the intent, 
propagating the intent of those who put him under captivity and made it impossible 
for him to have a free mind’.51 This argument seems appealing, but cannot be seen 
as something else than a lege ferenda reasoning, transferred mens rea as a way to 
handle extreme indoctrination. The legal argument would be to prove that this 
indoctrination, this traumatised background, could be tied to mental disease or 
defect or duress in accordance with Article 31 of the Rome Statute, which will be 
addressed below. 
 Another alternative would be to exclude the victim-perpetrators from the sphere 
of ‘most responsible’. John Borneman argues that the core of legitimacy for systems 
under the rule of law is to locate the ‘actual perpetrator’ and not a substitute.52 All 
perpetrators cannot be located in ICL. Thus the corresponding core of legitimacy in 
ICL rather lean towards locating those ‘actually most responsible’; those creating 
                                                
50 John Borneman, Settling Accounts. Violence, Justice and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997), 23. 
51 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript from Pre-
Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court, page 42, line 11-14. 
52 John Borneman, Settling Accounts. Violence, Justice and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe, 
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the incentives of atrocities would be those that suffer from it – the engineers of the 
mass machine. The legitimacy of the ICC ought to be related to how they manage 
their selective policy. Ongwen’s uncle Odong states his opinion on the matter while 
observing that former fighters are walking free in Uganda when his nephew is not: 
 
If anyone is to be tried, it should be the early members of the LRA, the ones 
who volunteered to fight and swelled their ranks with children they abducted 
and indoctrinated. They are the ones who forced 14-year-old Ongwen to 
become a killer in order to save his own life.53  
 
This quote is a perfect example for what, inter alia, Martii Koskenniemi calls ‘show 
trials’ without reason. There is simply no argument to accept these situations where 
a few political leaders are tried while the rest are granted amnesty as beneficial.54 
But, since it is the duty of the ICC to prosecute those most responsible for atrocities 
where they have jurisdiction, it is paramount to exclude the victim-perpetrator from 
the most responsible sphere if we do not want them to be sentenced. This could, for 
instance, be done as a matter of policy making from the ICC, where they develop 
the idea of most responsible.   
  Another aspect is the selectivity of arrest warrants from the ICC. It is of course 
impossible that a 30-year long war consisting of multiple core crimes could be 
singled down to this one individual. Especially in light of how the Court has 
neglected to investigate state-perpetrated atrocities, something heavily criticised by 
human rights organisations.55 The obvious response is thus: why punish Ongwen if 
you do not punish the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF)? But the show is 
booked, the choices are made, the politics of the case is set and the framework of 
truth is somewhat cemented. Chief Prosecutor Bensouda of the ICC states: 
As it concerns judicial proceedings, only the cases of Joseph Kony or 
Dominic Ongwen are before the ICC. No other LRA member is subject to 
ICC proceedings. We have seen encouraging trends: many LRA fighters are 
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returning home and reintegrating into their communities. I urge those still in 
the bush to also seize any opportunity to stop fighting and return home, 
where you have a chance to rebuild your lives.56 
 
However, bringing the victim-perpetrator to trial could be done in different ways. 
Notwithstanding matters of evidence, there could be a proper sentence, a judgment 
with narrative including their traumatic background, where victim-background is 
used to mitigate the sentence or a defence leading to acquittal. Another alternative is 
to change the law, to review Article 31 of the Rome Statute and to develop the 
doctrine of duress and mental disease or defect, and include the compromised 
perpetrator with their ‘rotten social background’.57 The theory of a rotten social 
background was developed in the US where the strong relationship between 
socioeconomic deprivation and criminal behaviour needed a response in criminal 
law theory. This is similar to Ongwen’s background, with the difference that 
Ongwen not solely suffered a socioeconomic deprivation in extreme poverty in 
Uganda, but even that rotten social background was taken away from him:  he was 
born into a rotten social background, and then abducted from that context into an 
even more brutal abyss. Still, the defence theory is the closest analogy to be found 
so far in criminal law.58 In criminal law, exculpatory defences, such as insanity and 
intoxication in criminal law all spring from the same theoretical foundation, best 
described in its simplicity by H.L.A Hart: ‘no one should be held blameworthy and 
punished for criminal conduct if he or she acted involuntarily – that is, without free 
choice’.59   
  Philosophically there is a slight difference between the absence of choice and the 
absence of thinking, but both can be placed under the umbrella of an absent mind. 
Arendt held that the key factor to how atrocity and evil spread is that the majority 
do not think – the masses develop a thoughtlessness. This mass thoughtlessness is 
                                                
56 Message from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, calling for 
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not legally relevant in trial, but an aspect of the complexity that questions the ability 
of ICL to best respond to mass atrocity. Arendt asked herself: 
What happens to the human faculty of judgment when it is faced with 
occurrences that spell the breakdown of all customary standards and hence 
are unprecedented in the sense that they are not foreseen in the general rules, 
not even as exceptions from such rules.60 
 
The legal challenge of allowing the victim-background defence is the difficulty of 
application and limitation. Allowing environment deprivation to be argued in a 
moral defence is one thing, but to provide space for it in criminal procedure is 
another. When is a victim-background serious enough to exclude voluntarily actions 
and when does heavy influence turn into brainwashing? It has been argued that a 
brainwashed-defence should be available in criminal law.61 One of the strongest 
arguments is the above-mentioned concept of transferred mens rea, where the 
brainwashed defendant adapts the criminal intent ‘that is not the actor’s own’, 
meaning that it is something belonging to the indoctrinators.62 It has been submitted 
that this defence, in relation to other excuses, lacks distinctive character that makes 
it difficult to circumscribe in trial.63 This could lead to legal uncertainty, since it 
would be complicated to know when it could be applied. In comparison, the excuse 
of mental disease or defect, although with its own aspects of uncertainty, is based on 
psychological assessment. The defence of environmental deprivation would call for 
a sociological assessment. However, the rotten social background could also be seen 
as a version of mental disease or defect, where the social background has produced 
psychological effects and subsequent criminal behaviour.   
  There have been cases in domestic criminal law where psychiatrists have 
testified that the defendant’s social background led to the criminal behaviour, but 
did not impact them enough to label them as insane.64 Professor Dressler comments 
critically that ‘the law has allowed only those defences that fall within specific, 
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reasonably identifiable categories in which choice is obviously substantially 
limited’.65 The desire for identifiable categories for excusable defences is based on 
the view that a system of punishment ought to be generally deterrent. The 
legitimacy of penal law is dependent on a majority that avoid criminal behaviour, 
while a few criminals get punished, which causes the majority to stay deterred. To 
be excluded from this responsibility must therefore be granted groups separated 
from the two main categories of law-abiding citizens and criminals. Regarding the 
insanity defence, Professor Williams said: ‘Being a defined class their segregation 
from punishment does not impair the efficacy of the sanction for people 
generally’.66  Applied in this case, the argument would be that it is impossible to 
define what constitutes a severe rotten social background and what does not. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that it would be difficult to appreciate any background 
more severe than Ongwen’s, and child soldiers could be an identifiable category in 
ICL.  
  The question of a victim-background accompanied with mental disease and 
defect is troublesome. If this Ongwen-background could constitute a defence, the 
following question must regard impunity. If the defence is legit in the future, a lot of 
victim-background perpetrators could profit impunity thanks to their background. 
Professor Morse’s response to the rotten social background theory is that 
environmental circumstances are unlikely to entirely remove a defendant’s control 
of choice.67 The same thought seems to lay behind the dismissal of the defence in 
the PTC II in the Ongwen case, stating that the circumstances were within his 
control and that he could have chosen not to rise in the ranks.68   
  As has been hinted, the rotten social background defence could form a part of 
existing defences such as mental disease or duress.69 It needs to be accommodated 
to acknowledged legal theory. 70  Which defence that would accommodate the 
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victim-perpetrator in the most appropriate way is not difficult to say. 
Accommodation to mental disease relates to indoctrination suffered as a child 
soldier, while duress is related to the absence of choice. The latter is more far-
fetched since it must be proved that the upbringing in the LRA is similar to a 
permanent imminent threat. The PTC II, however, held that the question of duress 
was not as clear so as to lead to a non-confirmation of charges, but that the actual 
trial will resolve this question.71 The argument would be that the totality of the LRA 
upbringing as a child soldier construes a circumstance of constant threat that pushes 
the defendant to act accordingly. Although factually near impossible to prove, the 
importance of authority shall not be forgotten:  
An act carried out under command is, psychologically, of a profoundly 
different character than action that is spontaneous. The person who, with 
inner conviction, loathes stealing, killing, and the assault may find himself 
performing these acts with relative ease when commanded by authority.72  
   
2. 2. 1 The Victim-Background Defence  
The development of a defence for accused perpetrators with child soldier-
backgrounds could consist of different elements such as: (1) general psychological 
principles; (2) the historical-sociological experience of child soldiers; (3) the 
defendant’s upbringing, severity of context and (4) the defendant as a subject in 
international law.73  
  The first element would be similar to the expert submission of Dr Schauer in 
Lubanga. How child soldiering lead to post-traumatic stress disorder, how they 
possess few skills to function in a normal society without violence and how the 
victimhood is brought into adulthood. This element would preferably try to tie the 
child soldier-experience to the defence regarding mental disease. Psychological 
aspects of child soldiering will be left to appropriate child psychiatrist with 
expertise regarding neurodevelopmental aspects of child soldiering.   
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The second element would regard sociological aspects of living as a child soldier, in 
particular in the LRA, but also historically compared with child soldiers’ experience 
from other rebel groups. This element, alongside the first element, would preferably 
be tied to arguments regarding duress as ground for excluding responsibility.  
  The third element would, in this case, circumscribe the upbringing in the LRA, 
which is known as one of the most brutal rebel forces to date. The PTC II stated that 
escapes were not rare, but they still were exceptional; in fact, the defendant is 
pleading in considerable length about the fatal consequences of Ongwen’s escape 
attempts. In the criminal society of the LRA, escaping was sanctioned, while 
staying in the rebel group was the normal and ‘right’ thing to do. This element is the 
crucial step to constitute a defence such as mental disease or duress, or a new 
exculpatory defence within ICL.  
  The forth element is centred on child soldiers’ protégé status within international 
law. As a child soldier you are a victim in ICL, but also protected by the 
international community and the state of origin. The defence team of Ongwen is 
pleading that international humanitarian law shall offer protection and that states, 
according Article 38 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, shall ensure that persons under 15 not participate in hostilities. Furthermore, 
Article 39 of the same convention specifies: 
States shall … take appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: Any 
form of neglect, exploitation or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts.74 
 
Perhaps the last element will prove to be the most cumbersome aspect in the 
Ongwen trial since a convicting judgment would mean to reject the international 
community’s protection of child soldiers. It is here the assessment of a victim-
perpetrator is done; are the subject in first hand a victim of crimes against 
international law, or should the perpetrator-side be seen as predominant? While the 
other elements could be handled strictly legalistic with inconsistent use of expert 
submissions from psychiatrists, the fourth element would place the Court in an 
adverse position towards the international community and potentially anger the UN 
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and NGO’s who proclaim the importance of reintegration and rehabilitation for 
former child soldiers. This fracture within international law – between its 
conventions and ICL – is perhaps the most delicate issue regarding former child 
soldiers’ legal status.   
  This defence is controversial and not recognized whatsoever in criminal law 
generally, even less so in the early stages of ICL’s evolution. But the victim-
perpetrator raises the question of blame, or rather the lack of blame, something that 
our collective conscience demands of the criminal law and the development of ICL 
is constantly underway. 
2. 3 The Narrative in International Criminal Trials 
The main difference between trials and other stories, such as literature and history, 
is the trial’s unique compulsion to condemn. Complex narratives about life among 
atrocity are, in general, more suited for the vivid presentation of literature. But the 
content of a judgment, as well as literature, creates and establishes stories that did 
not exist before: sentencing to imprisonment makes someone lose his or her 
freedom, etc. The narrative of a judgment, the story, follows the perpetrator, but 
also affects the audience in their perception of atrocity and their perpetrators. 
Judgments do not only review past events, but creates and develops the view of the 
crime and the understanding of atrocity. The challenging question is thus if trials 
need to acclimatize with the story of a victim-perpetrator such as Ongwen. The 
following statement from Vergès will introduce this section of the thesis. 
 
Man is very complex, his opinions and his mind are neither black nor white. 
The judge, however, asks binary questions that must be answered ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. At the end of the trial there is the prosecutor facing the defence. Both 
lawyers are drawing their arguments from the same dossier—how can either 
account be the complete truth?75  
 
International criminal trials have in all essence followed the classical division of 
criminal law when it comes to its characters. The division between the good, 
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innocent victim and the evil, abusing perpetrator contains a division of guilty and 
non-guilty, right and wrong. The international criminal trials clearly picture the 
defendant as disgraceful in relation to the pure and ideal victim. 76 Is there a space 
for a more nuanced picture of the perpetrator as both victim and perpetrator? This 
part of the thesis aims to more thoroughly discuss the content of a judgment rather 
than the actual outcome of the judgment.  
  To challenge the binaries in ICL is, however, not a simple task. We are all 
complex and multi-nuanced persons, but that characterisation does not fit in trials. 
‘It is necessary to choose one interpretation. The chosen interpretation constitutes 
the very framework or the context of the trial.’77  Or as Jean-François Lyotard calls 
it: the differend.78 Accepting the differend means accepting the roles within it, who 
is the accused and what she or he is accused of, and in the long run framing ‘the 
context among those between which the political struggle has been waged’.79  
 
A case of differend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of 
the conflict opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the 
wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.80 
  
The setting and the context is a part of the dispute – in this case the trial. Critically, 
one can argue that there is a factual differend juxtaposed to the ICC itself in its 
inability to prosecute the state side of conflicts where atrocity occurred. The Chief 
Prosecutor of the OTP stated that ‘all sides involved in the conflict’ will be 
investigated ‘in complete independence and impartiality’.81 In reality, the ICC 
requires state cooperation to conduct necessary investigations and have not yet 
convicted any state officials for crimes under the Rome Statute.  In this sense, it 
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could be added to the theory of the differend that even those not being parties in the 
trial are forming the dispute. 
  In this case, the absence of the representatives from the Ugandan army is 
‘haunting’ the trial, with trails of accepting the truth of the referring government.82 
The fact that the documented atrocities allegedly committed by the Ugandan army 
are not at trial is already to accept the differend where the LRA are the perpetrators 
in the situation in Uganda. The differend attached to the LRA could not be 
transformed into an investigation about core crimes committed by the Ugandan 
army. In this sense, the differend also possess a direction of wrongdoing, which is 
pointed towards the LRA in a locked trial setting. Either the LRA is guilty or not; 
no other conclusion or consensus can follow the judgment. If they are not found 
guilty, and the guilt starts to be directed against the Ugandan army, then there is a 
need of a new trial – in this sense the discourse of differend is inflexible. The trial is 
thus fixed and the response to the situation in Uganda depends on conviction.   
  Rarely enough, the abducted children turned into soldiers have experienced a 
transformation: to be identified on both sides of the differend. The differend 
attached to the LRA is not changed, but Ongwen exists on both sides of it – as a 
victim and a perpetrator of the LRA.  For Ongwen, the whole differend is within 
him and he as an individual represents both sides, encircling the dispute. Accepting 
the differend, that he, as a representative of the LRA, is accused is also to accept his 
past as victim of the LRA, which is an indirect effect of the trial. With some 
imagination, you could handle the ‘situation in Uganda’ with Ongwen as the only 
individual at trial, one day as a victim and the other day as the accused. On the 
contrary, if he is not found guilty, the idiom of the ICC removes his jurisprudential 
status as a victim. Ongwen is the only one from the LRA brought to trial, and the 
differend attached to the LRA disappears by acquittal.83  
  The above-suggested perspective of the differend within actually pinpoints why 
the story of Ongwen is too complex for present day trials when it is analysed in the 
light of the most responsible and the reason is this: The first setting of the differend 
in the case of Ongwen is made when the ICC issue arrest warrants for the leaders of 
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the LRA. The LRA are the perpetrators in the dispute and their victims are corollary 
the victims at trial. Since one of the most responsible possesses this differend 
within, the binaries are disturbed in a way that must be handled with either 
ignorance, or a new view on what a trial and a judgment can consist of. In the latter 
situation, this differend within needs to emerge from within and be allowed to 
openly challenge aspects of these binaries. Ongwen would play the part of partly 
perpetrator and partly victim in the courtroom where he must be allowed to speak in 
both these roles. He could thus transcend the binary without disrupting the differend 
attached to the LRA – they can still be depicted as the wrongdoers. Ongwen would 
be recognised as a compromised wrongdoer who committed evil deeds because of 
the wrongdoers. Ongwen, the rare subject that encircles a differend symbolises the 
complexity of the situation in Uganda, which makes him a perfect subject for 
establishing historical and etiological understanding, but perhaps not the perfect 
subject for individual responsibility, as we know it. If this cannot be done in the 
courtroom, alternative remedies must be the next resort. But, with ignorance and 
reductionism, where the differend stays within, the ICC will be left with a ruptured 
system that could be accused of not fully understanding the nature of the deeds they 
intend to deter.  
 The trial’s search for objectivity does not play well with the shape shifting nature 
of human in conflict where atrocities occur. Instead, ICC convictions need to 
portray the individual as guilty without any reasonable doubt, and provide justice to 
the civilian victims in that very conflict. This is especially important when, as in the 
case of Ongwen, where one individual is the only one being prosecuted. It has been 
argued that these trials are more about establishing the truth of historical, political 
and criminal events, than the actual punishment of the individual.84 Scholars mostly 
make this notion, but the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Tadic, for example, spent 
the first 69 pages on Balkan history. An account that was later relied upon in the 
Milošević trial.85   
 By telling the story and the truth of the past, the wounded community is provided 
a condition in which it can recreate social life and simultaneously relieve some 
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collective guilt. 86 Via a richer narrative, telling the story of these indoctrinated 
persons, we can improve the hunt for the most responsible. Finding the persons with 
the catalyst roles would have a better symbolic value in the local community. 
Engaging didactically in this way could detect the conditions and manifest these 
circumstances where the atrocities grow. Maybe someone creating victim-
perpetrators, those structuring the incentives, could be a modern definition of the 
most responsible. 
  However, Arendt criticised the Eichmann-trial for the introduction of didactic 
purposes about historical, political and educational objectives:  
 
The purpose of the trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest 
ulterior purposes - 'the making of a record of the Hitler regime...' can only 
detract from the law's main business: to weigh the charges brought against 
the accused, to render judgment and to mete out due punishment.87  
 
Detracting from ‘law’s main business’ creates what Arendt calls a ‘show trial’ – 
more of a political show for the public opinion than a criminal trial about innocence 
or guilt. This risk is relevant. Not recognizing international criminal trials as 
somewhat a show from the international community would be a mistake. ICL and 
cases before the ICC are politicized, it is political, and once again concerns a 
referred situation as a whole, not only individual guilt. Besides, it would be possible 
to resist the political show; the political lessons to the public, while instead interact 
with the history of the accused – since this is in the interest of ‘justice and nothing 
else’.88 Arendt later stated that, although courts cannot accept a defence that lays all 
responsibility on the system and not the person, the system itself cannot be left out 
of account.89  
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The defence team of Ongwen pleaded with a narrative, including the history of 
Uganda and the history of Ongwen himself. This pleading, in essence, centred on 
the indoctrination, geopolitical chaos and the supernatural influence of Kony; this 
was not Ongwen’s war.90 But the PTC II did not shed a light on this narrative in 
their conformation of charges. This illustrates that the narrative is out there but not 
allowed to enter. The pleading also included the responsibility of the international 
community where Ongwen should be protected by conventions but ended up 
enslaved by Kony. Further, a promise from the United Nations envoy, Joaquim 
Chissano, who participated in the Juba Peace talks, reassured to help Ongwen 
escape from the LRA. In the light of this, it would be ‘inapposite to suggest 
individual criminal liability’.91  
 Establishing and continuing with the individual responsibility in ICL does not 
necessarily mean that the focus of the trial shall be strictly individual, as in domestic 
criminal trials where the only question is whether or not the accused committed the 
crime. Important aspects of ICL – such as the solution of conflicts that are too 
complex for the domestic system – certainly need a wide narrative and an 
understanding of context. Let us not forget that the ICC is complementary in 
helping Uganda with the ‘situation concerning Lord’s Resistance Army’: a situation 
where individuals such as Ongwen lived in a different society where they did not act 
in anti-social way, such as criminals in general do, but in a criminal normality. This 
is one of the most interesting differences between domestic and international 
criminal law; that perpetrators in ICL often follow the social code – they are those 
who abide by the rules. Arendt explained the procedure in totalitarian regimes as 
moral standards turned upside down, where a new reality is created.92  
 
In a normal political and legal system, such crimes occur as an exception to 
the rule … However … in a state founded upon criminal principles, the 
situation is reversed.93  
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Crime becomes law and law becomes crime.94  This is not only the greatest 
difference between domestic law and ICL, but also the greatest legal and moral 
challenge: to express a criminal normality where one could be found is legitimate in 
light of this complexity.95  
  But these Janus-faced individuals are, however comfortable, not always great 
when it comes to answering the question: what happened here? If we focus, as in the 
Ongwen case, on the perpetrator part of their multiple identities, the truth cannot 
simply be presented that way.  Of course, it may be argued that this is not the 
mission of ICL, but if its not dealt with, then we are stuck in a helix of individual 
evil, a situation where the circularity of violence is individualised, trivialised and 
condemned but not explained. Although the inversion of society, the world upside 
down, complicates the legal division between victim and perpetrator, this inversion 
could be brought to light even with a conviction. The wider narrative is not only for 
the defence, or a defence itself, but a general improvement of legitimacy of ICL’s 
understanding of atrocity.  
 It seems like the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility in ICL is stuck 
between the comfortable trial of a strict individual focus and the wider narrative, 
which tells the ‘truth/s’ by referring to historical context and structural cause. 
Which path to take depends of what we think that ICL should achieve – if anything 
at all other than individual trials. In the end, this is a question of ideology and 
historical theory; if structure or individual agency is forming human behaviour, ICL 
has chosen the latter. But large political crimes cannot be handled as narrowly or be 
as fact-focused as criminal trials in general are. Judging the facts in ICL also means 
judging the context.96 The crimes are even formulated with ‘wide and systemic’ as 
requisites, which means that context is necessary to constitute a core crime of ICL. 
Because of this concatenation between facts and context, the individual 
responsibility doctrine creates a multitude of questionable situations. The context is 
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not only needed by the defence, but also by the prosecutors in international criminal 
trials. 
 
The judges looked to history to make more sense of the crimes ... It is an 
appropriate backdrop, since you just do not kill that many people without a 
context.97 
 
The ICC would achieve some pedagogic and didactic goals with a wider narrative. 
In general, it would explain how atrocities like these could occur, how they spread, 
and in this case how victim-perpetrators are born. To simply issue warrants of arrest 
for individuals and sentence them with a narrow context-perspective would not, 
with the ICL diminishing deterrent effect, come to terms with the conditions of the 
crimes.98 But the wider the narrative – the more side effects will occur from 
establishing the truth of events. The more space the victim-perpetrator is given in 
trial – the more of an abstract and complex picture could be delivered. The 
individual accused of crimes against humanity can raise the question whether or not 
that could be us, if we were raised in the same circumstances. But understanding the 
accused, his motives, and letting him speak also risk that the trial becomes a 
propaganda show for the cause of the rebels.99  Someone who only cared about 
context and structure was the controversial defence counsel Jacques Vergés with his 
strategy of rupture. 100  The strategy concerns when the defendant ignores the 
differend, the roles within it, and reverses the discourse with an attack towards the 
system represented by the Court and the prosecution. In Ongwen, this would mean 
to focus the pleading around crimes committed by the State party, the Ugandan 
army, and the double standard underlying this selectivity of prosecution. However, 
this strategy is mostly used as a last resort in show trials that are doomed to follow 
the line of the prosecutor. 
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 To provide space for the traumatised backgrounds of perpetrators in ICL 
narrative is far from uncontroversial. On the contrary, the defendants are 
traditionally displayed as evil sadists – closer to monsters than men.101 Even though 
perpetrators, even without victim-duality, do experience trauma, this is left out in 
trial. It has been argued that even the more traditional perpetrator’s trauma should 
be acknowledged, not necessarily for sympathy or empathy, since that would be 
unseemly, but rather to look at the big picture.102 The big picture narrative is needed 
to heal societies and make the transition from conflict to peace smoother. Some 
understanding for the perpetrators is desired, since thousands of the actual 
perpetrators are going back to be neighbours to the victims after the conflict. Of 
course, this assignment first and foremost belongs to the defence, to plead about the 
creation of a perpetrator through victim-background, and bring that experience into 
the courtroom. Notwithstanding the final judgment, someone has at least brought 
the defendant’s truth to court and consequently to the public at large. Although it 
would not directly affect the trial, the narrative about Ongwen’s background is out 
there; several articles about the extraordinary circumstances in the Ongwen case 
have been written. In other words, an important story can deserve and need 
publicity although that particular story is not transformable to the language of 
acquittal in trial. There are examples where the pleadings of the defendant have 
widened the scope of conflict. One is when Drazen Erdemovic’s guilty plea led to 
the discovery of a massacre that had not been covered before.103 This is, of course, 
not comparable to the victim-background of Ongwen, but rather an example of 
letting the defendant’s story improve the full story of crimes committed during the 
conflict.104 
 Regarding pedagogic goals, there is one fundamental story to be learned from 
Dominic Ongwen and that is that it could have been us. There is nothing more 
human than to act accordingly in ones surroundings to survive. Maybe that is why 
that complexity is trivialised and treated with reductionism; because that complexity 
proves that each and every one of us possess the capacity of monstrosity.  
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2. 4 The Capacity of International Criminal Law  
Reading about Ongwen and the LRA makes you question the capacity of criminal 
law. Stories about abductees forced to drink the blood from their former friends 
transcend legal order. It is difficult to picture these personalities in a court system, 
in a legal order, where they themselves have grown up in a parallel society without 
even a tendency of the Rule of Law. The law suddenly feels insufficient to master 
the patterns in the LRA.  
 
I know a lot of law … But I’m not a lawyer. That’s why I can see what it is 
like. It’s like a single-bed blanket on a double bed and three folks in the bed 
and a cold night. There ain’t ever enough blanket to cover the case, no matter 
how much pulling and hauling, and someone is always going to nigh catch 
pneumonia. Hell, the law is like the pants you bought last year and the seams 
are popped and the shankbone’s to the breeze. The law is always too short 
and too tight for growing mankind.105 
 
The goals of ICL are not only those of domestic criminal trials: deterrence, 
retribution and incapacitation, etc. Acting in the global political arena, the courts 
have also expressed a will to achieve security and peace, to stop current conflicts, 
and create reliable historical documentation of the context where the crimes were 
committed. Notwithstanding that the international importance of the latter goals 
risks making procedure against individuals more about politics than law, threatening 
the rights of the accused, it does not require a lot of thinking to realise the 
overabundance of these goals.106 As a point of departure, a wider narrative would 
increase this overabundance. It would not manage expectations in a way that could 
dress ICL in a suit of success; and the capacity and reputation of ICL is related to 
the aspiration and the corollary expectations. 
 In the core of the problem stands whether ICL is capable of handling collective 
violence of this complex kind. It is a legalist conviction that moral questions of this 
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altitude can be solved by judicial procedure.107 Arendt has argued, already in the 
Nuremberg trials, that: 
 
For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It may as well be essential 
to hang Göring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to 
all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.108  
 
Or as Tallgren puts it, ‘perhaps there is pain which has no closure’.109 Individual 
responsibility presumes certain levels of rationality among the perpetrators, which 
seems somehow limited as a model of explanation. Certainly since, as worth 
repeating, these crimes are often committed in a ‘context of the chaos of massive 
violence, incendiary propaganda, and upended social order that contours 
atrocity’.110 
  Former child soldiers are not the only problematic legal subjects in ICL. The 
same counts for the Eichmann-type: the bureaucratic type of evil, sitting at his desk 
signing papers that indirectly leads to hundreds of people dead. The child soldier 
and the bureaucrat, however, share some characteristics – they hang-on in, and 
imitate, their context. All creation, even the creation of a perpetrator, begin with the 
exertion to imitate The perfect persecutor would possess the more demonic type of 
evil; someone inspired by Lucifer whose sin is pride. Instead these individuals often 
act in a criminal normality where they possess thoughtlessness – either because of 
young age and unfinished mental development, or because of automatism behind a 
desk far away from physical violence. Since the trials also establish historical 
record, they ought to shed light on the circumstances in the background of these 
deeds. This does not mean that the deeds’ severity shall be reduced; the deeds can 
still be depicted by ICL as grave although the doer himself thought his acts were 
deeds of virtue. This idea can exist while the narrative of the doer is further 
nuanced. A wider narrative of the complex perpetrator is desired where there is one. 
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This division, between the doer and the deeds are the foundations behind Arendt’s 
argument against demonic evil.111  
 It is hard to think of any deed with more morally and ethically negative 
association than crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Invented with 
the intention of grasping what is not possible to grasp. The behaviours constituting 
international crimes are more thought of as evil in terms of ethics and morality than 
customs and habits, ‘and we know only too well the alarming speed with which they 
are unlearned and forgotten when new circumstances demand change in manners 
and patterns of behaviour’.112 The behavioural patterns of the doers in a criminal 
normality could take place in trial and thus improve understanding of how atrocity 
occurs. Thoughtlessness and absence of conscience is, according to Arendt, the real 
creatures and the components of evil. Acting as a moral authority, the ICL needs to 
acknowledge, through thought and global conscience, the creation of perpetrators to 
be the counterpart of evil deeds – the moral agent of the world. But trials with 
narrow scopes that dismiss perpetrators’ backgrounds risk being an institution of 
thoughtlessness. 
 Abovementioned Smeulers has developed a typology for perpetrators in ICL: 
Besides submitting that the ICL criminal often is an ordinary man in extraordinary 
circumstances, she developed a typology where Ongwen would be categorised as a 
compromised perpetrator. The consistent and pure compromised perpetrator would 
likely entail acquittal with a duress defence, as someone who does not have a choice 
to not co-operate if they want to survive. But this type could be ‘transformed into a 
far less reluctant perpetrator’.113 The best-known example of this transformation is 
the so-called Kapos in the concentration camps of the Second World War. Former 
prisoners were given the position of a Kapo, which is a type sort of guard with more 
power than the other prisoners. As documented, a lot of Kapos abused their 
power.114 If the ICL trials could give account for this spiral of violence and creation 
of a perpetrator, for example by using this typology, it would lead to increased 
understanding of how atrocity occurs. This account needs to be expressive about 
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how Ongwen played a part in the LRA. Ongwen and Uganda deserve a plausible 
portrayal, which reflects the reality of many Ugandans. The judges of the ICC have 
the capacity to formulate the Ongwen-persona in such a way, even with a guilty 
verdict. 
  If ICL wants to function as deterring, we first need to understand the cause 
behind the atrocities that we want to deter. To understand the making of a 
perpetrator such as Ongwen, their story needs to emerge from the trial itself. Even 
the outrageous have their motive, and ‘comprehension does not deny the outrageous 
… it means the facing up to, and resisting of, reality, whatever that may be’.115 
Sentencing individuals by an individualised, non-contextual depiction cannot give a 
corollary effect towards the masses; the collective is the necessary component to 
commit an international crime. Allowing ICL to influence the handiwork of the 
masses – the industry of atrocity – instead of relieving collective guilt. That being 
said, it is a great challenge to acknowledge the victim-past of Ongwen and 
simultaneously respect the dignity of the victims, certainly those who are heard as 
witnesses in trial.  
 Bearing in mind that the evolution of ICL is marked by speed, the demand to 
revolutionise the very foundation of a criminal trial is, in a sense, naïve. But the 
complementary role of the ICC must not be mistaken as its purpose; it is simply a 
necessary component in creating jurisdiction. If this would be the purpose, it would 
be satisfying enough that ICC sentenced those who the domestic system failed to 
convict. The purpose is to sentence those who commit atrocities against humankind 
and prevent future atrocities. Irrespective of how terrible the acts are, a person could 
be guilty of crimes against humanity, yet still be morally ambiguous. As Mark A. 
Drambl notes: 
 
Whereas much of expressive theory focuses on law’s ability to narrate norms 
and prohibitions, this article suggests that expressive theory might attain 
etiological goals, namely, to clarify – rather than occlude – how atrocity 
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spreads and in particular the roles that those who are dually victims and 
perpetrators play in that process.116 
 
Worst-case scenario would be if the ICC were used only to solve conflict by taking 
the referring government’s side in civil wars. This scenario is an illegitimate and 
legalistic solution of handling complex conflicts, and risks trivialise complex 
conflict through trial. There is a need to simplify, but not necessarily to shot a 
simplistic silver bullet at the core of the problem. If the adversary nature of trials 
cannot handle the full story of the creation of its perpetrators, there is a need for 
change or abstinence. ICC should develop a precedent with a rich narrative to 
explain the ambiguous mind of humans in conflict, or, otherwise stay away from 
these characters. Instead, they should direct their selectivity to focus on other 
persons within the ranks, preferably the dictatorial leader Kony.  
 Widening the narrative in ICL trials is within its formulated goals of constructing 
a reliable historical context of conflict, but the complicated task of establishing the 
‘truth’ of events seems out of its capacity in present day. Painting this bigger picture 
is complicated enough to multiply the issues at trial. A good example of this 
incapacity is how the victim background in the Ongwen case is faced with 
reductionism, where the Court trivialise the complexity of context. The comfortable 
solution ought to be to reduce the aspirations of establishing historical reliability 
and focus solely on the individualisation.117 ICL would then become more strictly 
complementary in its role and act as substitute where a domestic procedure has 
failed. This avenue does not mean that the ICL judges can abandon the 
determination of context, since it is necessary to examine whether or not a 
widespread crime has occurred. The context must become a manifest part of the 
jurisprudence.  This wish to widen the narrative and the objective of education, 
history lessons and expressive etiological understanding descends, according to 
Koskennemi, from an ambivalent accommodation to Realism in international law. 
That is, acknowledging the conclusion that there is a need to take account of 
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context, but simultaneously discard the Realist’s conclusion that law has nothing to 
do with it.118 
 The problem with lowering aspirations is that mass atrocities in Uganda have 
been occurring during a period of over 30-years and the investigation is per 
definition a historical account because of the considerable amount of time elapsed. 
However, reducing the historical aspect of ICL would certainly lower the 
expectations of ICL, since the broader the portrait of a conflict; the more victims 
would expect prosecution.119 Defining a historical record at trial correspondingly 
affects the alleged perpetrators when it comes to judicial fairness, since determined 
findings in an earlier case prevents the accused in a later trial to challenge the 
circumstantial evidence. This problem does not exist in domestic criminal law. On 
this note, it is submitted that Arendt had a point when stating: ‘the law's main 
business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment and 
to mete out due punishment.’120  Additionally, there is the question of multiples of 
truths that can be highlighted in trial, and the fragility of truths that are tied to 
distant events. The defence team for Ongwen stresses the evidentiary difficulties 
when managing a 30-year-long conflict. 121  In this sense, trials are defective 
interpreters of history. Further, rules about presenting evidence affect historical 
facts: Richard Wilson notes that, since evidence must fit in legal categories, the 
record will automatically be deficient and not objective.122 Important historical 
events that are not relevant to the defendant can be excluded. 123 However, this does 
not affect the example of Ongwen. 
 Since the point of departure is that all stories are of the same value, the trial risks 
becoming scenery for historic revisionism. The prime example would be the denial 
of the holocaust.124 This view is criticised with the argument that a legitimate 
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123 Rules of Evidence, 89 (C), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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criminal case always needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, which would 
provide a shelter from ‘revisionism’.125 
  Further, it must be remembered that judges of ICL are not willing to take on the 
traditional role of historians, which does not mean that the background of these 
crimes are forgotten. But, if ICL decides to hold on to the goal of establishing a 
reliable historical record, the victim-perpetrator subject deserves to be portrayed; 
otherwise it would not be reliable, but rather trivialised.  
 On this note, it is time to draw a line between truth and completeness according 
to history. It is submitted that authors use the notion of historical truth, instead of 
completeness, as an answer to the question: what happened in this chaos? 
Nonetheless, completeness is the aspect of the record that claims the facts of 
committed crimes; not only those by the LRA in the Ugandan civil war. 
Completeness is not within the capacity of ICL, certainly not in the light of the 
abovementioned differend attached to the courtroom. But the historical truth is 
about the reliability of the facts addressed by the judges.126 This is where the facts 
about a perpetrator background could be included. It does not necessarily mean that 
the Court shall increase its workload and investigate the perpetrators past; this 
assignment is left to the defence, but rather to respond to the facts when they have 
been forwarded. 
 The ICC does not really seem willing to establish the historical record of the 
perpetrator. However, this is desired and can be done by other actors. Jaspers 
developed a quite simple idea in his letters to Arendt that suggested the best 
situation would be a process of examination and clarification, something close to 
the present day truth commissions. The reason behind this idea was that the globe 
lacks ‘a court that, as representative of humanity, is competent to judge a crime 
against humanity’.127 Today, we have the ICC as the closest example of a court that 
tends to represent humanity. The future will tell if this Court is competent, so far the 
challenges seem as incomprehensible as the crimes they investigate. As an example, 
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the community-creating effect of a judgment from the ICC would more likely serve 
the memory of the international community than the local Ugandans who still credit 
the traditional remedies such as the mato oput. The mato oput is a form of cleansing 
through healing that is believed to bring reconciliation in a way that formal legal 
procedure cannot. Instead, the ICC acts in an ‘international community-creating’ 
effect with a service of vain remembrance. Philosopher Alain Finkelkraut identified 
the ‘vain memory’ as a concept where the outsider not participating – those far from 
the differend – can admire our own moral standards while observing someone like 
Ongwen being accused of crimes against humanity.128 Because, by depicting an evil 
individual at trial, we correspondingly fortify our own moral position in the 
‘international community’. 
  In the end, the overabundance of the aspirations of ICL is juxtaposed to the 
idealism often formulated in international relations, and it has its clear limits.129 
Noticeable idealism is used both when a state denounces the iniquity of another 
state and when ICL depicts the perpetrators of war criminals. As Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, with nuances, pictured it: ‘It is not by confining one’s neighbour that 
one is convinced of one’s sanity’.130 Translated into the language of international 
law and international relations: it is not by depicting a state as illegitimate that you 
define and ensure the legitimacy of the state. Into the language of ICL, it is not by 
prosecuting perpetrators, not being prosecuted in the ‘unwilling or unable state’, 
that you ensure the legitimacy of the ICL-procedure.131 In the phrases of criminal 
procedure; it is not by defining someone as a perpetrator that you erase their victim 
experiences.  
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Below, I will stress some aspects, reflections and conclusions following the Ongwen 
trial. There is more important questions juxtaposed to this trial, but I have made a 
selection. An extract from Child Soldiers International’s submission to the ICC is an 
important point of departure: 
 
The resolution of these important issues will set an important precedent and 
have ramifications for former child soldiers, both as perpetrators and as 
victims, beyond the Ongwen case.132 
 
3.1 Hard Cases Make Bad Law 
Some kind of sympathy, and certainly empathy, is aroused when reading about the 
fate of Ongwen and to introduce the victim-perpetrator defence in ICL could risk 
triggering the legal maxim that ‘hard cases make bad law’.133 The Ongwen case 
could be seen as one of those unfortunate and exceptional cases that would work 
poorly as a precedent and general laws. However, the creation of horrendous 
perpetrators through child soldiering is not exceptional. Not allowing this defence, 
or the wider narrative, would demand that this situation with child soldiers 
becoming ‘most responsible’ stays exceptional; otherwise it would be illegitimate to 
not address the issue.  
3. 2 A New Type of Deterrence 
Notwithstanding the fate of Ongwen’s trial, a wider narrative could lead to a new 
type of deterrence. Not at all linked to the notion that certain crimes equate life in 
prison, but as a warning sign that surroundings of criminal normality develop a 
society towards a moral collapse. The famous strategy of Nazi Germany was to little 
by little increase the moral collapse, from exclusion to extermination, a gradual 
sequence of anti-Semitic measures. To acknowledge these steps, the creation of a 
society where mass atrocity becomes custom, would place the individual in a more 
sensible context. This is more of a global-conscience approach, but in an era of 
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globalisation there is a greater chance of preventing isolated communities to 
develop their own horrendous normality. To depict that what is about to happen is 
an abnormal exception, and if they do not withdraw form the moral inversion, 
exception can spread limitlessly and become rule. When exceptions turn to rule, 
when crime becomes law, it is only a matter of time before the atrocity occurs. If the 
victim-background is included in trial, the ICC can, for instance, deter victims to 
stay in the context of perpetratorisation.  
3. 3 A Post-Modern Procedure 
A lot has happened with ICL since the Nuremberg trials. For example, we have a 
new view on child soldiers, which is to see them as protected subjects in 
international law and victims of crimes against humanity within ICL. It is because 
of this view of the child soldier that Ongwen appears as a complex Janus-face, but 
the individual responsibility was not developed with present day respect for 
conventions such as the Convention of the Rights of the Child. It is however, not 
unlikely that the victim-perpetrator would be responsible even in the future, but the 
judgment requires acknowledgment of context. ‘No one ... who spent his life among 
rascals without knowing anybody else could have a concept of virtue.’ 134 A 
childhood spent among rascals should, at least, be portrayed in trial.  
  If the ICC delivers a precedent of criminal responsibility for former child 
soldiers, alternative sentences deserve to be addressed. Even scholars that argue that 
there is nothing extraordinary with the pending Ongwen case admit that he is 
psychologically broken down, desensitised and dehumanised. 135  If Ongwen’s 
traumatised child soldier past is not enough so to constitute duress defence, this 
should be a signal to open a discussion of alternative sanctions, for example forensic 
psychiatric care.  
3. 4 Sentencing a Victim-Perpetrator 
Sentencing a former child soldier under ICL would develop the idea of individual 
responsibility. It would send the signal that we demand people to have an inherent 
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judgment that resists indoctrination. Not only an ‘eye not blind and a heart not stony 
and corrupt in order to spot unlawfulness’, but also an independent faculty of 
conscience that exist in every human being, unaffected by environment. 136 
 It is, to put it mildly, difficult to provide a preventive effect to future victim-
perpetrators. The compromised perpetrator, for example a child soldier, would not 
be able to calculate their actions in relation to the ICC. Prevention gathered from 
normal convictions is as held above low, individuals that end up in an international 
court are simply too few. Those convicted are generally from the losing side in a 
civil war and, cynically speaking, this could be an incitement to be even more brutal 
in military operations.137 However, individual prevention regarding Ongwen will be 
provided with a conviction, but surely ICL must aspire to accomplish more than 
that. Missing the general deterrence and prevention function is serious; this is 
supposed to be the main function of punishment.138  
 Re-education and victim-perpetrators de lege ferenda would need some kind of 
psychiatric care to invert their upside-down world back to normal. Re-educational 
aspects for Ongwen are difficult to conclude, but he has been clear about leaving the 
LRA for good. Ongwen escaped the rebel group and encouraged other members to 
surrender. 
 
I am now free and when you look at where I sleep you won’t believe. I 
realized that I was wasting my time in the bush. I have studied the LRA and 
found that the LRA has no future. You all know how brave I was but I 
decided to come out, then what are you still doing there?139 
 
Sentencing Ongwen of committing crimes that he never would have committed, 
without his abduction, may also end up being politically costly. In one-way or 
another, the seriousness of being a victim to international crimes is marginalised, 
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and the public will ask the international community: how could this be? How this 
will affect the legitimacy of the ICC remains to be seen.  
 The most plausible solution will be to convict Ongwen and then address his 
background in terms of mitigating circumstances during the sentencing stage of the 
trial. The personal mitigating circumstances cannot be underestimated. To recognise 
these circumstances in detail would strike a fair response to his victim-perpetrator 
duality. Whether the verdict declares Ongwen guilty or not, the effect will rupture 
the trial, the differend, and disturb the binary system. To acknowledge a hybrid 
character, a perpetrator and a victim, risks relativizing the other victim’s dignity. 
Contrary, if he should be found guilty, risks undermining their understanding of 
atrocity. His hybrid, his differend within, challenges the very foundations of a trial 
and a legal precedent and the ICC of today do not possess the capacity to fully grasp 
this hybrid.  
  This is the concluding perplexity. To ignore his victimised past, the ICC would 
appear illegitimate – trivialising understanding of atrocity through trial. To be 
legitimate, the past must emerge from within and the judges must address the guilt 
of LRA’s criminal normality and thus mitigate the scope of individual 
responsibility. Meanwhile, some days ago in trial, Ongwen himself has a blurred 
understanding of the scope of individual criminal responsibility: 
 
I did understand the document containing the charges but not the charges. 
Because the charges – the charges I do understand as being brought against 
LRA but not me, because I’m not the LRA. The LRA is Joseph Kony …140 
3. 5 Law without Morality 
The undertone of this thesis has often been based in the opinion that perpetrators, 
such as Ongwen, do not deserve to end up in the ICC. Not only because the story 
itself is sad and ironic, but also because the selectivity could be directed to other 
types of perpetrators than the compromised one – this is still submitted. 
Nonetheless, maybe the only justice Ongwen deserves is that his story is spread? 
Since Ongwen ended up in the ICC, the legal reality is that his background merely 
would have bearing in the sentencing stage of the proceedings as a mitigating factor. 
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It is difficult to accept that Ongwen’s background could be a defence itself: victim-
background is certainly not uncommon among perpetrators in both domestic and 
international proceedings. The reaction from others and myself is most likely tied to 
the fact that (1) the Ongwen case considers the most serious crimes known to 
mankind and (2) Ongwen is the first one at trial that has been both victim and 
alleged perpetrator of these crimes. It does not, yet, exist any type of jus cogens 
defence where victims of crimes against humanity would be immune to 
responsibility. No possible interpretation of the Rome Statute could lead to an 
accepted defence of past life experiences: Ongwen was not a child, but around 30 
when he allegedly, during a three-year period, committed the crimes at stake in the 
ICC. A duress defence would necessitate proving threats of imminent risk of death 
threat or seriously bodily injury during three years, something that is possible in 
theory, but not factually. 
 So why is a straight conviction of Ongwen, although totally in line with the 
Rome Statute, still upsetting people and inflicting ambivalence? The answer could 
be that the moral questions impelled transcend the capacity of law, as we know it. In 
that case, response to atrocity must be accompanied and complemented with other 
paths of justice, such as truth commissions to deliver a compelling historical record 
of the creation, nature and existence of atrocity. The demand of punishment from a 
legitimate state or institution, such as the ICC, shall ‘implement a moral world’ and 
not be neutral to that extent, but reflect vision and utopia.141 The ‘moral world’ in 
this case is cumbersome, where the moral of the story, cynically speaking, could be 
formulated: ‘stay away from abduction and child soldiering!’ 
 Nonetheless, the narrative and the understanding of atrocity will continue to be 
substantial aspects of the evolution of ICL. In the end, the ICC, as a representative 
for the international community, has a huge responsibility to provide a legitimate 
story of the capacity of the complex human mind. After all, we have decided that 
the human mind, and not abstract entities, is responsible for incomprehensible 
atrocity. 
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